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Abstract. IoT devices often operate unsupervised in ever-changing en-
vironments for several years. Therefore, they need to be updated on a
regular basis. Current approaches for software updates on IoT, like the
recent SUIT proposal, focus on granting integrity and confidentiality but
do not analyze the content of the software update, especially the IoT ap-
plication which is deployed to IoT devices. To this aim, in this paper, we
present IoTAV, an automated software analysis framework for system-
atically verifying the security of the applications contained in software
updates w.r.t. a given security policy. Our proposal can be adopted trans-
parently by current IoT software updates workflows. We prove the via-
bility of IoTAV by testing our methodology on a set of actual RIOT OS
applications. Experimental results indicate that the approach is viable
in terms of both reliability and performance, leading to the identification
of 26 security policy violations in 31 real-world RIOT applications.
Keywords: IoT applications · Software Updates · SUIT · model check-
ing · security policy.
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is spreading into diverse application domains at
an unstoppable pace: homes, hospitals, means of transportation, manufacturing
-just to cite some- are all being affected by the coming of the IoT, and will
significantly benefit from its adoption. IoT devices collect, exchange, and pro-
cess data to support the dynamic and possibly even autonomous adaptation to
new and/or evolving contexts. Due to changing requirements, the functionalities
required by a device at deployment time is very likely to change in the future.
The software stack of IoT devices, consisting of bootloader, operating system,
and application(s), will need frequent updates for a number of reasons: to offer
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additional functionalities, to support new communication protocols, and/or to
patch software bugs (including security vulnerabilities).
Securing the IoT software update process is key to the security of the IoT.
To this end, the IoT ecosystem must be provided with the means to ensure the
integrity of the software updates, i.e., that the updated software has not been
tampered with by a malicious agent. The IETF IoT group is addressing the prob-
lem through the development of a new standard, Software Updates for Internet
of Things (SUIT) [19], for the software update process of IoT devices. In SUIT,
an IoT Software Maintainer (ISM) creates an update bundle, i.e., the firmware
image (composed of an operating system and an application) holding the core
logic of the IoT device. Then, the ISM uploads the updates to a distribution
server, the Update Server (US), that dispatches the update to the devices using
over-the-air (OTA) or wire technologies. The SUIT workflow has been designed
to enforce the integrity and the confidentiality of the software update, thus pro-
viding end-to-end security between the author of the update (i.e., the ISM) and
the device, even if an untrusted US mediates the process. This ensures a form
of end-to-end security between the (trusted) ISM and the devices.
Unfortunately, even when a mechanism such as SUIT is in place and ensures
the integrity of the software updates, there are no guarantees on the content
of the update. This shortfall implies that an ISM may introduce, wittingly or
not, an insecure software component that can compromise the security of the
updated device. For example, the Zigbee Worm [25], triggered using a malicious
firmware update, allowed the attackers to get full control over Philips Hue Smart
Lamps.
In this paper, we present the IoT Application Verification (IoTAV) Frame-
work, a novel analysis methodology that supports the automatic verification of
security properties in applications running on IoT devices. Given an IoT device
application in an executable format and a set of security properties, the frame-
work tries to determine if the app meets the expected security properties. This
is done by automatically (i) extracting the IoT app from the firmware image
(without the need of source code), (ii) building a formal (i.e., mathematical)
model of the app, and (iii) automatically evaluating a set of security properties
(i.e., a security policy) by leveraging state-of-the-art model checking techniques.
The framework enables the definition of security policies directly by the ISM
or by trusted third-party entities, e.g., the network operator or the IoT device
manufacturer.
IoTAV can be applied to both new and previously deployed devices. More-
over, it does not require the source code and, therefore, can be applied to
third party applications whose source code is not available. As we will see later
(cf. Sect. 3.5) it is almost independent of the hardware that will host and run the
application. Finally, the framework complements and leverages current firmware
updates workflows, including the new SUIT solution.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solution, we developed a
prototype implementation of IoTAV for the SUIT update process in the RIOT
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ecosystem [24]. Finally, we validated the prototype against a set of 31 real-world
RIOT applications, thereby identifying 26 security policy violations.
Paper organization. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
introduces the major concepts of the IoT software update process and then
details the SUIT standard, along with its security limitations. Section 3 describes
our novel IoT Application Verification Framework for the automatic analysis of
the applications contained in the IoT updates. Furthermore, it provides the
specifications of a prototype implementation for the RIOT ecosystem. Section
4 discusses an assessment of IoTAV against real-world RIOT applications and
presents the collected results along with a discussion on the current limitations of
the approach. Section 5 analyzes the state-of-the-art proposals for securing IoT
software updates and for analyzing IoT apps, thereby underlying the differences
w.r.t. our approach. Finally, Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Software Updates for IoT Devices
The IoT software update process is an essential operation for maintaining a
suitable level of efficiency and security of IoT devices. Over the last few years,
the research community has been working on the definition of several IoT update
processes [20], among which the software update for resource-constrained devices
is still an open research challenge [1]. Resource-constrained devices, as specified
in RFC 7228 [7], use microcontrollers (like the Arm Cortex-M) on which they
run a real-time operating system such as Contiki, FreeRTOS or RIOT [14], just
to cite a few. To this aim, several firmware update solutions have been proposed
in the last years, like FOSE [11], The Update Framework (TUF)3, and Uptane
[21]. However, most of the proposed mechanisms are tied to specific operating
systems or hardware architectures, and thus, they are not general-purpose.
To overcome such limitations, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
is defining a standard for firmware updates called Software Updates for Internet
of Things (SUIT) [19]. The main goals of SUIT are interoperability (w.r.t. the
platform and the firmware distribution technology) and end-to-end security.
The SUIT standard, currently in draft status, includes a definition of the
firmware update architecture [17], an information model [18], and a manifest
description [16]. Hereafter, we define the firmware image as a binary file that
contains the complete software stack of an IoT device (i.e., the OS and the IoT
application), according to the terminology adopted by IETF [17]. The update
process involves the IoT devices to be updated, the IoT software maintainer,
and the Firmware Update Server, as sketched in Fig. 1.
The typical firmware update procedure works as follows: an IoT software
Maintainer compiles the OS and the IoT app and generates a new firmware
image. In the SUIT specification, firmware images comprise a manifest file that
embeds information such as the location of the firmware image for delivery,
3 https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf
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Fig. 1. A SUIT update scenario (inspired by [29]) where a developer is able to introduce
a malicious app in the update pipeline.
dependencies, cryptographic information, and device data. Both the firmware
and the manifest are then published onto the IoT Firmware Update Server, which
is responsible for storing the update and notifying the IoT devices about the
availability of a new update. On the device side, the firmware update is handled
by a firmware update module named Firmware Consumer, which retrieves both
the manifest and the firmware image.
Upon receiving a notification from the IoT Firmware Update Server, the
Firmware Consumer retrieves the manifest, checks the digital signature and the
firmware sequence number to ensure the integrity and the freshness of the update
image. If the verification succeeds, the IoT device pulls the firmware from the
URI provided in the SUIT manifest, and stores the firmware image on the flash
memory. The flash memory is divided into several memory regions (slots) con-
taining (i) the bootloader and (ii) two slots, one containing the current firmware
and the other is reserved for the update firmware. After the writing process, the
bootloader reads the metadata from the firmware slots and chooses to boot the
newest valid firmware. Using such an approach, an interruption in the update
process (e.g., due to power loss) cannot cause the system to boot an invalid,
corrupted or incompletely received image [29].
2.1 Security Issues in SUIT
The SUIT information model [18] defines a collection of security threats for the
update process. As discussed in [29], such threats can be categorized into: (i)
tampered firmware, (ii) firmware replay, (iii) offline device attack, (iv) firmware
mismatch, (v) flash memory location mismatch, (vi) unexpected precursor image,
(vii) reverse engineering, and (viii) resource exhaustion. Although the SUIT
model suggests a set of security requirements and countermeasures, it is worth
noticing that all these threats are related to the integrity and the confidentiality
of the update process only, while the content of the update is inherently assumed
as trusted. Therefore, the SUIT workflow allows an ISM to upload a firmware
image containing security vulnerabilities or malicious behaviors. Furthermore,
SUIT allows the ISM to transfer its authority to another entity, e.g., a third-
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party developer, that can deliver to the ISM some components of a software
update (e.g., the executable of the application to be updated) or triggers the
update process directly. In this case, the ISM has no mechanism to assess the
content of the external software components, and must fully trust the external
entity.
For instance, consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 1. The ISM delegates two
external developers (i.e., A and B) for updating the OS and the IoT applica-
tion, respectively. Let us assume that developer A is honest (i.e., she dispatches
a benign and reliable OS image), while developer B is malicious (i.e., she in-
troduces a malware IoT application). According to the SUIT workflow, the ISM
blindly composes the firmware image and dispatches the update to the Firmware
Server. Then, the IoT device only verifies the authenticity and the integrity of
the firmware image and installs the malware update. Such scenario depicts an
actual and widespread attack vector, as the Philips Hue smart lamps security
incident [25] and the Jeep Cherokee hack4 have been carried out by injecting ma-
licious software components inside the update process, without triggering any
security enforcement mechanism.
To reduce the impact of unreliable updates, we argue that the SUIT update
process needs to rely on a methodology to assess the security of the firmware
image and in particular, of the IoT application. Such a methodology must be
able to automatically evaluate the behavior of the firmware according to a set of
security requirements, in order to allow the same ISM to deliver only validated
and certified software updates. The security requirements can be defined directly
by the same ISM, the IoT device manufacturer, or by a trusted third-party entity
involved in the update process, like a Network Operator or a Device Operator,
as defined in the SUIT standard.
We also argue that the methodology should work as a black box (i.e., with-
out requiring the source code), in order to be systematically applied to any
executable provided by third-parties. Finally, we argue that the analysis pro-
cess must be carried out on the firmware image before it is submitted to the
SUIT pipeline, in order to leverage the security mechanisms provided by SUIT
to prevent any further modification of the image.
3 The IoT Application Verification Framework
In order to mitigate the aforementioned security concerns, we propose a novel
verification solution called the IoT Application Verification Framework (Io-
TAV). IoTAV allows to automatically evaluate the security of the IoT applica-
tions included in firmware images in a black-box fashion. In details, IoTAV en-
ables the definition of a set of security requirements, codified as a security pol-
icy, that are then automatically evaluated on the application executable using
state-of-the-art model checking techniques. As depicted in Fig. 2, IoTAV can be
seamlessly included in the existing update pipeline, like the one defined in SUIT.
4 https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/blackhat-jeep-cherokee-hack-explained/
9493/
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IoTAV is able to detect malicious updates (dashed arrows), thereby discarding
those that doe n comply with the security policy and notifying the ISM, without
affecting the normal operation in case of secure updates (solid arrows).
Fig. 2. SUIT Update process with IoTAV. The IoTAV Server ensures that the IoT app















































Fig. 3. The IoTAV verification workflow.
3.1 Formal Security Assessment Workflow
IoTAV features are granted by the workflow depicted in Fig. 3. Initially, the ISM
compiles (P.0) and generates the firmware image update (P.1). Then, she pub-
lishes the executable (P.2) to the IoTAV Server, which stores the firmware update
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in a database (Firmware Storage). Then, an application extraction procedure is
applied to the firmware image (B.0) to extract only the application part (B.1).
After that, the application executable goes through a modeling phase (B.2) that
outputs the corresponding application model (B.3). Hence, the model is passed
(B.4) to a verification process that checks its compliance against the security
policy (B.5). Security policies are retrieved (B.6) from a policy database (PDB)
handling policy instances that can be customized over the configuration of the
single device. If the verification succeeds (B.7 → YES), IoTAV server executes
a packaging procedure for the firmware (B.8). Finally, it bundles the system up-
date following the regular SUIT publish procedure and notifies the IoT Firmware
Update Server. Otherwise (B.7 → NO), IoTAV Server notifies the IoT Software
Maintainer and discards the update. The notification contains the results of the
verification process (i.e., which parts of the model violates the security policy
and why).
3.2 Application Extraction and Modeling
The first step of the IoT app verification process is the model generation. To do
that, IoTAV parses the firmware image and identifies the part of the executable
related to the application logic. After that, the Application Modeling lifts the
application machine code to a higher-level language, usually an Intermediate
Representation (IR), by relying on a disassembler. From the IR, the service
can then deduce the structure of the application program. The IoT Application
Verification Framework builds a complete application model through a fruitful
combination of Control Flow Graphs (CFGs), Call Graphs (CGs), and Inter-
procedural Control Flow Graphs (ICFGs). A CFG is a directed graph made by
nodes representing basic blocks, e.g., pieces of branch-less code, chained through
edges to represent the control flow transfer. Although CFGs are widely used to
model all the possible execution paths of a function call [28], they are able to
represent the control-flow of a single procedure only. To overcome such limitation,
IoTAV model generation procedure combines the CFGs of each procedure with
the calling relationship between them, through CGs, thereby obtaining the ICFG
of the whole application.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code of the ICFG construction algorithm. Each
call site node is a root node of its own (local procedure) CFG. It is referenced
in other computed CFGs since its procedure is called by the other ones. As a
consequence, the app_icfg contains a list of the CFGs rooted at the start_node
and at each callee_node, each related to another one by reference. Hence, by
constructing the ICFG from an executable, IoTAV gets the structure of the entire
application.
Nevertheless, since the IoT Application Verification Framework aims to de-
scribe the behavior of a system from a security standpoint, any operation which
is not security-relevant is abstracted away. Therefore, the Application Modeling
block records only security-relevant operations defined in the security policies,
notably, file operations, cryptographic primitives, and network procedures. All
irrelevant API (Application Programming Interface) calls that are invoked in a
8 N. Dejon et al.
Algorithm 1 Compute the ICFG from local CFGs
1: procedure ICFG construction
2: app_icfg ← []
3: start_node← get the entry node
4: callees_nodes← get callees and callees of callees
5: add local CFG of start_node to app_icfg
6: for callee_node ∈ callees_nodes do




sequential way or in a conditional way (branches) are grouped and then pruned.
This way, IoTAV optimizes the application model for the model checking phase.
3.3 Policy specification
A policy describes the properties that must hold in the model, while properties
mirror a system description that can be formally expressed. In detail, the IoT
Application Verification Framework allows the definition of security properties
that need to be enforced in the IoT application once it is encapsulated inside
the firmware update. Following the same approach of [3] and [2], IoTAV enables
the definition of security policies on the interaction between the IoT application
and the underlying OS in terms of API calls. Since the ICFG extracted from the
application can be interpreted as a state graph, IoTAV uses Temporal Logic for-
mulas, namely Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [12] and Computational Tree Logic
(CTL) [13]. An LTL formula describes a pattern for a sequence of events. Any
actual sequence of events may match or not the pattern. Hence, one can express
properties about the sequence of events with temporal operators. For example,
from a given state, Fp ("eventually") means the property p will eventually hold
at some point in the future, while Gp ("globally") means that the property p
always holds in the future.
Instead, the Computation Tree Logic is based on a branching notion of time,
meaning that its model of time is a tree-like structure in which the future is not
determined. CTL considers different paths in the future, any one of which might
be an actual path that occurs. Indeed, such a notion of time can represent the
possible execution of a software program. In order to express if a property holds
for all paths or some of them, two quantifier operators are introduced: the A
operator ("for all paths") and the E operator ("there exists a path").
For example, the formula "AGp" states that the property p should hold at
each state of any path, whereas the formula "EGp" states that there exists a
path where the property p always holds (and eventually some paths that never
hold property p).
Finally, IoTAV policies enable the definition of security properties in terms
of a logical expression to be evaluated, as in the following example.
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1 "never_fread" : A [G FRD =0];
Here, the sample policy bans any use of the fread C function. It states that
along any path from the initial state, no state should set the FRD variable. In
other words, the variable representing the fread function should never be part
of the application model.
3.4 Model checking
In order to verify the policy compliance of the IoT application, the IoT Ap-
plication Verification Framework leverages model checking techniques that have
been successfully applied to numerous real-world problems. Model checking can
be mapped to a reachability problem, i.e., checking whether the model of the
application cannot reach an undesirable state. Applying Temporal Logic policies
to the model allows to verify some properties at any time (or state of the sys-
tem). The model checking process ends up with a compliance result, that states
whether the security policy is satisfied by the application model.
In order to prevent unbounded computations that are unacceptable in Io-
TAV workflow, the Model Checking module includes a timeout mechanism. Thus,
the model checker produces three possible results: (i) YES — the model com-
plies with the policy; (ii) NO - the model violates the security policy; or (iii)
TIMEOUT (TO) — the time threshold has been reached.
One of the most critical issues in model checking is the so-called state explo-
sion problem [10]. In order to check some properties, the model checker needs to
explore the entire state space, which increases the complexity as the number of
states grows large. Our security model addresses this problem by reducing the
analysis to the sole security-sensitive operations, thus limiting the size of the
corresponding model.
3.5 IoTAV Implementation
In order to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of the IoT Application Ver-
ification Framework, we developed a prototype implementation of IoTAV as a
server appliance compatible with the SUIT update process for a RIOT ecosys-
tem. It is worth noticing that, although the IoT Application Verification Frame-
work is compatible with a generic SUIT update process, the focus of this proto-
type is the compliance with the current RIOT implementation.
SUIT in the RIOT Ecosystem. RIOT [5] is an open-source OS, based on a
modular architecture built around a soft real-time micro-kernel. RIOT is struc-
tured in software modules that are aggregated at compile-time, around a kernel
providing core functionality like process scheduling, inter-process communica-
tion, and threading. This approach allows building the complete system in a
modular manner, including only modules that are required by the application
at stake. One of these modules is the application module, which contains the
IoT application.
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RIOT implements the SUIT update described in Section 2. The RIOT update
firmware is a bundle that contains both the OS and the IoT application in a single
Executable and Link Format (ELF) file. The IoT Software Maintainer can (i)
build the update, (ii) generate the corresponding manifest file, and (iii) push
them to the IoT Firmware Update Server, by using a suit/publish command5.
On the device side, after the board boots the new firmware, RIOT starts two
threads: the idle thread and the main thread. The main thread is the first thread
that runs and calls the main function. This function needs to be defined by the
user application.
Application Modeling. Concerning static code analysis, the angr framework6
is one of the most popular frameworks used in top-ranked teams of the DARPA
Cyber Grand Challenge. It is a python-based binary analysis framework that
currently supports the most common architectures, including x86, ARM, MIPS,
and AMD, and it allows to retrieve the CFG of a program from its executable.
IoTAV uses this tool to extract the CFG of each program procedure and to
compute the overall ICFG. Since the entry point of the user application is the
main function, the IoTAV computes the ICFG from there, which lets the analysis
focus only on the application. For this, angr can be configured to begin the ICFG
recovery directly from the main symbol in the program.
Policy Specification and Model Checking. PRISM (Probabilistic Symbolic
Model Checker) [22] is one of the many existing model checkers. It is free, open-
source, and it analyzes complex systems according to probabilistic behaviors.
It also supports the model checking of non-probabilistic properties using LTL
and CTL. The latter capability supports the definition of the IoTAV security
policies. Indeed, the properties we would like to check with PRISM are the use
of APIs and the call ordering in all execution paths. We mainly focus on APIs
with a security meaning, because they are the only ones relevant in a security
policy, notably any file operation or crypto primitive.
With non-probabilistic expressions, PRISM can also generate counterexam-
ples and witnesses for further investigation on a failed property verification. Such
a feature allows manual investigation as a post-process to determine the reasons
that caused the policy check to fail.
Hence, the IoTAV Server embeds PRISM for the model checking phase,
thereby adopting security policies in LTL and CTL. However, since the PRISM
model checker needs to be fed with a model in its own PRISM language, we
added a conversion block from the recovered ICFG to the PRISM language.
PRISM can then compare these policies to the application model.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We carried out an experimental evaluation of IoTAV to prove the viability of
our proposal and evaluate the impact on the SUIT update process. The expe-
5 https://github.com/RIOT-OS/RIOT/tree/master/examples/suit_update
6 https://github.com/angr/angr
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rimental scenario is composed by an ISM which deploys updates verified by an
IoTAV in an IoT ecosystem made of RIOT-based devices. More specifically, the
experimental setup is defined as follows.
IoT applications. We took into consideration two sets of RIOT applications.
The first one is composed of 21 RIOT sample applications available on the official
repository7, while the latter is made by 10 RIOT applications used for a demo
dashboard8 use case by the RIOT Development Team. In particular, the latter
set contains a series of collecting nodes of environmental data (e.g., temperature,
humidity, and pressure) that rely on CoAP [26] and MQTT [15] protocols to send
their data to a real-time visualization dashboard.
SUIT Setup. We setup a standard SUIT environment composed by a Firmware
Update Server connected over-the-air to a SAMR21 Xplained Pro evaluation
board9 equipped with RIOT OS Release 2019.07. Then, we deployed an Io-
TAV Server, according to the scenario depicted in Fig. 2. Finally, we simulated
the ISM, thereby producing a set of firmware images for the update that are then
pushed to the IoTAV Server to trigger the SUIT update process. In detail, each
of the application under test is bundled with the OS on the evaluation board
(i.e. RIOT OS Release 2019.07) to build the corresponding firmware image. Both
the Firmware Update Server and IoTAV Server executes on two entry-level PCs
equipped with Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS, Intel Pentium (R) P6200 @2.13GHz * 2, 4
GB of RAM and 50GB HDD.
Security Policies. We defined a set of security policies describing three of the
OWASP IoT Top 10 Vulnerabilities 201810. The first two enforce the confiden-
tiality of (i) the data transfer using the MQTT protocol and of (ii) the local
file storage, as recommended in the "Insecure Data Transfer and Storage" - #7
OWASP Risk. The third policy enforces the exclusion of insecure or deprecated
C functions in IoT apps, as suggested in the "Use of Insecure or Outdated Com-
ponents" - #5 OWASP Risk.
Hence, we defined the following three PRISM policy expressions:
1 "mqtt_enc" : A [G MQPB=1 => (CPH_ENC =1 | AES_ENC =1 | CHA_ENC
=1 | CHA_POLY_ENC =1)];
2 "st_enc" : A [G (FPRNT=1 | FWRT=1 | FPTS=1 | FPTC =1) => (
CPH_ENC =1 | AES_ENC =1 | CHA_ENC =1 | CHA_POLY_ENC =1)];
3 "uns_c" : A [G SCPY=0 & SNCPY =0 & SCT=0 & SNCT=0 & SPRNT =0 &
VSPRNT =0 & GTS=0 & MKPTH=0 & SPTH=0 & SCF=0 & SSCF=0 &
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The first expression (mqtt_enc) ensures that the data are encrypted when
sent through MQTT using one of the following cypher algorithms cipher_-
encrypt, aes_encrypt, chacha_encrypt_bytes or chacha20poly1305_encrypt.
Instead, the second expression (st_enc) grants that data are encrypted when-
ever they are written on a file through fprintf, fwrite, fputs or fputc C
functions.
To represent both mqtt_enc and st_enc, we relied on the "=>" (implication)
operator in PRISM which states that when the left side condition is satisfied,
the right side should be satisfied as well.
Finally, the uns_C policy verifies that none of the insecure C functions (strcpy,
strncpy, strcat, strncat, sprintf, vsprintf, gets, makepath, _splitpath,
scanf, scanf, sscanf, snscanf, atoi, atof, atol) is used in the application.
4.1 Experimental Results
Table 1 summarizes the analysis results on the entire dataset. For each of the ana-
lyzed applications, we provide general details (name and Size of the executable),
the execution times (Modeling time, Verification time, and Total time), and
the results of the verification on the three policies. Since our analysis unveiled
some vulnerabilities in the RIOT applications, we reported our findings to the
RIOT Development Team.
Table 1. Execution times and policy verification results.
Time Policies
Applications S [kB] M [s] V [s] Tot [s] uns_c mqtt_enc st_enc
asymcute_mqttsn 249.9 165.0 76.0 243.0 7 3 3
bindist 33.9 31.0 7.0 38.0 7 3 3
ccn-lite-relay 335.2 169.0 138.0 308.0 7 3 3
cord_ep 255.0 161.0 84.0 247.0 7 3 3
cord_epsim 195.9 337.0 140.0 479.0 7 3 3
dashboard_riot_a8_m3 2400.0 1517.0 133.0 1652.0 7 3 3
default 72.7 53.0 13.0 66.0 7 3 3
emcute_mqttsn 235.8 476.0 133.0 611.0 7 7 3
filesystem 107.1 100.0 18.0 118.0 7 3 3
gcoap_example 249.9 427.0 171.0 600.0 7 3 3
gnrc_minimal 157.6 195.0 59.0 255.0 7 3 3
gnrc_networking 282.3 606.0 185.0 792.0 7 3 3
gnrc_tftp_example 286.6 638.0 208.0 848.0 7 3 3
hello_world 33.9 29.0 6.0 35.0 7 3 3
ipc_pingpong 38.4 31.0 8.0 39.0 7 3 3
lua_basic 335.3 5003.0 1658.0 6668.0 7 3 7
lua_repl 339.6 6099.0 1688.0 7794.0 7 3 7
nanocoap_server 184.1 312.0 123.0 436.0 7 3 3
ndn_ping 181.5 147.0 136.0 284.0 7 3 3
node_bmp180 3500.0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A N.A N.A.
node_bmx280 3500.0 201.0 43.0 245.0 3 3 3
node_ccs811 3500.0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A N.A N.A.
node_empty 3400.0 137.0 29.0 167.0 3 3 3
node_imu 2600.0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A N.A N.A.
node_io1_xplained 3400.0 117.0 27.0 144.0 3 3 3
node_leds 3400.0 112.0 27.0 140.0 3 3 3
node_mqtt_bmx280 3400.0 110.0 34.0 144.0 3 7 3
node_tsl2561 3500.0 179.0 35.0 214.0 3 3 3
posix_sockets_example 240.3 664.0 195.0 861.0 7 3 3
saul_example 49.3 39.0 10.0 49.0 7 3 3
timer_periodic_wu 43.8 37.0 11.0 48.0 7 3 3
Automated Security Analysis of IoT Software Updates 13
Policy Verification Results. IoTAV was able to successfully analyze 28 out
of the 31 IoT applications. Angr failed when trying to analyze the remaining
three applications; as a consequence, IoTAV was not able to extract the model.
The outcome of IoTAV verification process showed that the node_mqtt_-
bmx280 application (belonging to the demo dashboard use case) does not com-
ply with the mqtt_enc property, thereby indicating that the MQTT communi-
cation is unencrypted, and thus, the data are transmitted insecurely through
the network. Since the source code of the application is available on Github11,
we both inspected the source code and tested the application to validate our
findings. The manual analysis confirmed that data are published to an MQTT
broker unencrypted. Besides, we were able to execute the node on the evaluation
board. We successfully intercepted the plaintext data traffic sent by the applica-
tion through the tcpdump tool. Also, the emcute_mqttsn application failed the
mqtt_enc property as well.
Furthermore, IoTAV discovered that lua_basic and lua_repl applications do not
comply with the st_enc policy, since they include some file storage operations
without the adoption of any encryption support in place.
Finally, the experimental results show that the 71% of the dataset (22 out of 31)
violate the uns_c, and thus adopting insecure or deprecated C primitives.
Notes on Performance. IoTAV successfully evaluated the applications of the
dataset with a mean processing time of 191.2 seconds. The modeling generation
phase takes on average 80% of the total processing time, while the model checking
phase takes, on average, 20% of that time. The simplification and conversion
phases have negligible impact on the global performance.
4.2 Limitations
The experimental results show both the effectiveness and the applicability of
IoTAV in the SUIT update workflow, although its adoption comes with some
restrictions. First, the evaluation techniques applied by IoTAV on the firmware
image work with unstripped executables only, i.e., binaries containing symbols.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no tool is still able to extract CFGs
without any available symbols that could otherwise be used in combination with
our model extractor. Therefore, to overcome this limitation, we propose to add
the possibility to strip the firmware only after the policy verification step. To this
aim, the SUIT process for RIOT applications is still under active discussion and
could eventually include this feature. In addition to that, the static evaluation
of security policies may not cover all possible use cases for an IoT application.
For example, if one security property requires to detect whether a file has been
closed after being opened, the variable monitoring this property will still be
set even if the file is later reopened, thereby potentially affecting the results of
the analysis. To mitigate such issues, we are investigating the introduction of a
runtime monitoring technique, by extending the approach in [4].
11 https://github.com/future-proof-iot/riot-firmwares/tree/master/apps
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Finally, applications have been manually verified afterwards, with no false
positives. However, we noticed that some applications are not expected to verify
the policies, albeit the verification step succeeds. For example, this is the case
of asymcute_mqttsn, an asynchronous MQTT-SN implementation, marked as
meeting the mqtt_enc policy even if no encryption is used for the published
data. This is due to the fact that the API asymcute_pub is not listed among the
relevant APIs in the security policy. Such a result underlines how crucial is the
definition of appropriate security policies to be used in the IoTAV to avoid false
negatives.
5 Related Work
The increasing number of vulnerabilities found in IoT devices have raised the
need for reliable methodologies for securing firmware updates. To this aim, the
scientific and industrial communities have proposed different solutions. In [29],
Zanberg et al. survey open standards and open source libraries that provide
useful building blocks for secure firmware updates for resource-constrained IoT
devices. The authors propose the design and the implementation of a prototype
that leverages these building blocks. Bettayeb et al. [6] discuss security threats
against firmware update for IoT devices and all available secure firmware update
methods for IoT devices in the literature, like [20]. However, all of these works
are focused only on providing end-to-end security between the IoT Firmware
Update Server and the device, but they do not deal with the analysis of the IoT
application.
On this topic, some proposals for static and dynamic analysis of IoT ap-
plications have been already put forward. Soteria [8] and IotSan [23] are static
analysis systems that automatically extract a model of an IoT application and
use a model checker to validate application-specific properties. However, they
require the source code of the application. On the dynamic side, IoTGuard [9]
is a policy-based enforcement system that monitors the execution of IoT appli-
cations. IoTGuard requires to instrument the source code to collect application
data at runtime and build up a dynamic model that represents the runtime be-
havior of the application. The limitation of this approach is its invasiveness as
well as the need to modify the business logic of the application. Previous solutions
focus only on a single application, while SIoT [27] is the first tool that analyzes
distributed IoT applications to detect buffer overflow attacks. The authors’ idea
is to look at a distributed IoT system as a single monolithic application.
Our proposal extends the current state of the art by allowing us to sys-
tematically verify the compliance of the binary code of IoT applications w.r.t.
user-defined security policies without the need to modify applications.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a novel methodology, called IoT Application Veri-
fication Framework (IoTAV), for the systematic assessment of IoT applications
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w.r.t. a set of given security properties. We applied such a methodology to the
assessment of software updates in the IoT ecosystem. We proved the viability of
our proposal experimentally by carrying out automatic analyses of RIOT appli-
cations on an actual deployment based on the SUIT update pipeline. The results
yielded the identification of 26 security policy violations in 31 real-world RIOT
applications.
As future work, we will deal with the limitations described in Section 4, at
first. Then, the next step of our research will be to test the methodology on other
IoT architectures, OSes and firmware update workflows. Finally, although we
defined a set of policies based on the OWASP IoT Top 10 security risks, we argue
that novel and more comprehensive security policies should be investigated and
defined. To this aim, the interaction among IoT developers, network operators,
and device manufacturers could lead to the definition of more sophisticated and
widely-accepted security policies.
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